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COMMENTARY
CARVING HOLES IN THE SHERMAN
ACT: A COMMENT ON THE CITIZENS &
SOUTHERN CASE
Lawrence R. Velvel*
In the 1973-74 Term, the "new antitrust majority"' of the Supreme Court
made serious inroads upon antimerger enforcement by its decisions in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.2 and United States v. Marine Bancorporation.a In the 1974-75 Term, the Court made further inroads upon antitrust
enforcement in another case involving a merger, United States v. Citizens &
Southern National Bank (C&S). 4 The C&S case, however, was not confined to a merger question, nor was the majority's axe confined to
chopping holes in antimerger law. Rather, the Court also struck at four
other highly important facets of antitrust law: the idea that price fixing is
illegal, the concept that alleged procompetitive aspects of a restrictive
practice will not immunize it from being declared an illegal restraint of trade,
the idea that the lawfulness of a practice is measured as of the time of suit
rather than as of a prior date, and the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine.
It is somewhat surprising to see the Court make inroads upon the
foregoing doctrines. The rule that price fixing is illegal must be counted as
the most venerated doctrine of antitrust. Indeed, just one day before the
C&S opinion, the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar5 extended the
*

Professor, Catholic University Law School. Of counsel, Hill, Christopher and

Phillips, P.C. Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1960, J.D., 1963, University of Michigan.
1. This is Justice White's characterization of the majority opinion in United States v.

Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). Id. at 642 (White, J., dissenting)
(The majority opinion was authored by Justice Powell and joined in by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist).
2. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
3. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).

4. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
5. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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strictures against price fixing by declaring that learned professions enjoy no
antitrust exemption and that minimum fee schedules recommended by bar
associations constitute unlawful price fixing. Although the Court has on
occasion discussed possible exceptions to the doctrine which asserts that
procompetitive effects will not justify an otherwise anticompetitive restraint
of trade, 6 it has vigorously applied the doctrine in some of the most
important cases of the last decade. 7 The idea that the legality of a practice
must be determined as of the time of suit seems to have been more visible
under section 7 of the Clayton Act" than under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 9 but it nevertheless appeared to be reasonably well established as
antitrust doctrine.' 0 Finally, although the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is not as venerated as the price fixing rule and does not rest on as
logical a base, it has been applied a number of times by the Court." Thus,
the Court's opinion in C&S, which begins to erode these doctrines, must be
viewed as something of a surprising earth tremor, if not a seismic shock, for
antitrust enforcement.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF C&S

12

Citizens and Southern Bank is the predominant bank in the Atlanta,
Georgia area. Its Atlanta offices increased from three in 1946 to more than
100 at the time the case was tried. C&S and the next two largest banks in
the Atlanta area control approximately 75 percent of the local banking business.
For many years, Georgia prohibited banks located in cities from opening
suburban branches.' 3 Because of this restriction, C&S began forming de
6. See, e.g., IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936).
7. See United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
9. Id. § 1.

10. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 504-08 (1974);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168 (1964); United States v. E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
11.

See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);

Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
338 U.S. 338 (1949).
12. The principal source for background information is the Supreme Court's opinion
in C&S.
13. Act of Feb. 27, 1956, No. 195, [1956] Ga. Laws 309. This Act prohibited a bank
holding company from acquiring more than 15 percent of a suburban bank's voting stock.
In 1960, the law was changed to prohibit a bank holding company from acquiring more
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facto branch banks in the suburbs. It sponsored the founding of five such
banks and acquired five percent ownership of a previously independent
suburban bank. C&S filed the charter applications for the new branch
banks, which in form were independent corporations. It also assured the
branch banks of financial support, often an essential element in securing
regulatory approval for them. Each of the branch banks was a "correspondent associate" in the C&S system, with five percent of their stock owned by
C&S's holding company. Much of the rest of the stock was owned by
parties friendly to C&S: its officers, employees, and friendly customers.
Additionally, C&S provided the branch banks with manuals and memoranda covering all possible banking problems and procedures. These documents included information concerning interest rates and service charges.
The pricing data was stamped "for information only"; each de facto branch
was cautioned to use its own judgment in setting rates and charges; and each
was told that the antitrust laws required the use of independent judgment.
However, C&S bulletins also exhorted the branches to "get the rates [on
loans] up," and in fact, the rates and charges of the branch banks did not
14
vary significantly from those of C&S.
In 1970, Georgia amended its banking laws in a manner that permitted
C&S to convert the de facto branches into de jure branches, 15 and C&S
moved 'to acquire the branch banks. The United States then brought suit
against the acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton Act, and also alleged
that the ongoing correspondent associate relationships were restraints of
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Government sought
injunctive relief against both the merger and the ongoing restraints of trade.
II.

A.

THE MAJOR ISSUES

The Question of PriceFixing-The Per Se Charge

In asserting that the correspondent associate relationships involved
unlawful price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the
than five percent of a suburban bank's voting stock. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-207(a)(2)
(1967).
14. The Supreme Court noted that:
The District Court observed that in fact prices did not often vary significantly
among the 5-percent banks or between these banks and C&S National, but the
court attributed this to the "natural deference of the recipient to information
from one with greater expertise or better services."
422 U.S. at 113, quoting United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 372 F. Supp.
616, 628 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
15. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203.1(a) (Supp. 1975).
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Government asserted that there was a per se violation or, in the alternative,
that the arrangement was unreasonable. It lost on both counts.
Addressing itself to the per se charge, the Court stressed that the de facto
branch banks were founded by C&S and probably would not exist but for
the latter. 1 6 The creation of the branches thus allowed C&S to extend its
services to new markets, to offer a competitive choice to customers in
relatively small markets which otherwise might be subject to monopoly or
7
oligopoly, and to give to customers the benefit of sophisticated services.'
The Court noted that while some of the C&S memoranda to the branches
could be construed as advocating price uniformity, they were stamped "for
information only" and contained admonitions concerning the antitrust laws
8
and the need for independent judgment.'
The Court went on to suggest that if the case had dealt with independent
competitors having no permissible reason for close and continuous cooperation, then perhaps there could not be a valid finding that a price fixing
conspiracy did not exist. 19 Because the correspondent associate program is
legal under the Sherman Act, however, it was not clearly erroneous for the
district court to rule that under the particular circumstances the lack of price
competition stemmed not from unlawful tacit agreement "but instead
was an indirect, unintentional, and formally discouraged result of the sharing of expertise and information which was at the heart of the correspon20
dent associate program.
Although the arguments offered by the Court were not necessarily unpersuasive, it is remarkable that they carried the day. There have been many
prior cases in which persuasive arguments were made in favor of various
forms of price fixing, yet the Court, believing that price fixing is simply too
dangerous to the economy to be permitted, had previously refused to allow it.
16. 422 U.S. at 111. The only exception was one bank which had previously existed
as an independent competitor. The Court found that C&S's relationship with this bank
was immunized from a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by the 1966
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1848(d) (1970). 422 U.S.
at 111 n.21. Thus, the Court characterized the case as involving "de facto branching
through the formation of new banking units, rather than through the acquisition, and
consequent elimination, of pre-existing, independent banks." Id. at Ill. The Court
noted that "[die facto branching through the de facto 'acquisition' of pre-existing banks
might raise [different Sherman Act questions]." Id. n.21.
17. Id. at 112.
18. Id. at 113.
19. Id. at 113-14.
20. Id. at 114. The district court had attributed the lack of price competition to the
"natural deference of the recipient [the de facto branches] to information from one with
greater expertise or better services." 372 F. Supp. at 628, cited at 422 U.S. at 113.
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For instance, fears of ruinous competition have not justified the fixing of
prices on the ground that it is necessary to forestall chaos in an industry. 21
Likewise, vertically imposed maximum resale prices have been found illegal 22 although they could have been justified as fostering the delivery of more
goods at cheaper prices; 23 as promoting efficiency in the distribution system; 24
and, when wholesalers or retailers individually enjoy a monopoly position in
their resale market, as protecting consumers from price gouging, a function
performed by competition in markets where the latter exists. 25 Additionally,
the doctrine formulated in United States v. Colgate & Co.,26 which at least
impliedly sanctioned price fixing, has also been reduced virtually to the point
of uselessness 27 even though it can be argued that efforts to prevent
discounting are vital to protect a manufacturer's good will and the viability of
vast systems of distribution. Another form of price fixing, consignment
agreements under which manufacturers control the price to consumers, has
been outlawed even though the manufacturers still owned the product and
the arrangement was predicated on long standing precedent. 28 Likewise,
the exchange of information about the prices at which sales were made was
outlawed 29 despite strong argument that the exchange was procompetitive
because it gave sellers knowledge which enabled them to engage in active
price competition and the trend of prices had in fact been downward.30 Nor
can one overlook the fact that the presence of price fixing is said to
contaminate vertical customer and territorial restrictions ancillary to it even
1
if they might otherwise be lawful and procompetitive.3
None of this is to say that the Supreme Court has never protected
arrangements which arguably constitute price fixing conspiracies. In cases
such as Board of Trade v. United States32 and Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
21. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 330 (1897).
22. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).

23. See id. at 157-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 160 n.4, 167.
25. See id. at 166-67; id. at 169-70 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

26. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The practice authorized by the Court was Colgate's
publication of uniform prices followed by sales to dealers who would agree to sell at such
prices and refusals to sell to dealers who would not so agree.
27. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See
246

Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
id. at 342-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 260 (1963).
U.S. 231 (1918).
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United States,38 the Court's decisions gave legal sanction to schemes which
can be considered to have involved price fixing. Yet, on balance, the decisions
have been by far the other way. Thus, even though one may find its reasoning persuasive, the Court's decision in C&S is surely a departure from traditional notions concerning the per se illegality of price fixing. Moreover, the
decision opens the question of whether the current Court, which hardly seems
enamored of the antitrust laws in any event,8 4 will prove amenable in future
cases to blandishments that price fixing should not be per se illegal, since
it may be procompetitive. While it is true that the Court's decision in C&S
appears to be based in part on the peculiar facts of the case, 35 it is equally
true that, at one point, the Court appeared to be almost embarrassed by its
decision. 3 6 The fact remains that if the creation of de facto branches justifies
price fixing because their genesis is said to beget competition, then by parity
of reasoning, price fixing can be justified in other cases in which it can be
said to beget or preserve competition as, for example, cases in which intrabrand price fixing would help create interbrand competition. Furthermore,
if procompetitive price fixing is legal, then perhaps the vertical fixing of maximum prices should be legal in naturally monopolistic resale markets in which
such maximum prices perform the price restraining function normally performed by competition.
As noted above, the majority's acceptance of a rationale for price fixing in
the !C&S case may, because of the Justices' natural inclination or the
analogical pull of precedent, herald an enhanced susceptibility in other cases.
Such susceptibility would not only do serious damage to a basic per se rule
which has been a mainstay of antitrust enforcement, but would also vastly
diminish two other primary benefits associated with per se rules: the
conservation of judicial time and energy, and the creation of greater
certainty for business by making a practice illegal without need for the

33. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
34. In addition to C&S, Marine Bancorporation, and General Dynamics, other
decisions evidencing the majority's disfavor with antitrust law include United States v.
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch.,
Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422

U.S. 271 (1975); Connell Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).

35. See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 112, for the Justices' view that the de facto branch program
created new banks and competition which otherwise would not have existed.
36. See id. at 113-14. The Court ruling was merely a technical finding that it could
not find the district court's decision to be clearly erroneous; it indicated, however, that
there probably would have been a violation if C&S and the branches were truly
independent competitors.

Id.
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elaborate and lengthy economic inquiries which often cause antitrust litiga7
tion to be so protracted a
One last point worthy of note in regard to the Court's decision on the per
se question is the majority's remarkable willingness to accept highly selfserving evidence as proof of a lack of illegal agreement: the reference being
to the stamping of "for information only" on C&S price memos sent to the
branches and the admonitions to the branches concerning the need for
independent judgment, particularly under the antitrust laws. The dissent
thought the defendants' arrangements were an "elaborate fabric of
'consultations'" and "'advice and guidance,' ",38a view of the matter that
would appear to be far less naive-or perhaps far less a deliberate disregard
of reality-than the majority's. This is particularly so given the lack of
significant price competition and the overwhelming control of the branches
by C&S. One can hardly escape the conclusion that in past cases, such as
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 39 far less has sufficed to cause
defendants to be found guilty of unlawful price fixing.
That the Court afforded great credence to this evidence in C&S signifies
nothing less than an invitation to businesses and their counsel to manufacture
self-serving but essentially phony admonitory documents whose chief use will
be for litigation. Further, the Court's facile acceptance of the evidence
stands in contrast to earlier merger cases in which the Court had not given
much weight to similar declarations or documents. 40 One is left with the
suspicion that the deference shown to the documents in C&S is a further
indication that the majority is ready to make inroads upon the per se price
41
fixing rule.
37. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963);
cf. R.

POSNER,

ANTITRUST:

CASES,

ECONOMIC

NOTES,

AND

OTHER

MATERIALS

129

(1974).
38. 422 U.S. at 132 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

39. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-36 (1973);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174-76 (1964).
41. The credence given by the majority to C&S's self-serving evidence is reminiscent
of the judiciary's performance in United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969), and Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). In the former, Judge Timbers appeared to accept
the word of Harold Geneen, President of International Telephone and Telegraph Corp.
(ITT), that ITT's methods and motives in merging with Avis were the most pure. 306
F. Supp. at 783, 790. Given the wrongdoings under Mr. Geneen's leadership which
were subsequently uncovered in connection with Watergate, including wrongdoings
related to the antitrust case, one may wonder at Judge Timbers' credulousness. In
International Controls Corp., Judge Friendly exercised enormous ingenuity in twisting
matters so as to find that the actions of ICC's president were not serious violations of
securities law but rather were actions of a mere innocent, taken in good faith and
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The Question of PriceFixing-The ReasonablenessArgument

The Court's Opinion. The Government argued that the correspondent
associate relationship went far beyond the normal correspondent bank
relationship and therefore unreasonably restrained competition among the
five percent banks and between those banks and C&S. Although pointing
out that there is no fixed definition of a correspondent relationship, the
majority admitted that the C&S program did appear to have gone beyond
conventional correspondent arrangements.4 2 It further admitted that "[i]t
is conceivable that these relationships, separately or taken together, have
restrained competition among the defendant banks more thoroughly or
effectively than would have a conventional correspondence program. ' 43
Yet this finding did not make the arrangements illegal. Rather, the Court
noted that, while it is true that the "central message of the Sherman Act is
that a business entity must find new customers and higher profits through
internal expansion" 44 rather than by agreements with competitors and that
even commonly owned firms must compete with each other if they hold
themselves out as distinct entities, 45 C&S had previously been restrained by
state law from reaching the suburban market through internal expansion. 46
Since the majority determined that "de facto branching was the closest
available substitute, '47 it asserted that the purpose and effect of the de facto
branches, rather than being to restrain trade, was to defeat a state-imposed
restraint of trade which, in effect, made suburban, small town, and rural
areas captive markets for small banks. The Court concluded that it was
therefore procompetitive for C&S to circumvent the law by providing new
48
banking options while not eliminating existing ones.
Whether a more conventional correspondent relationship would have been
equally procompetitive was regarded as mere speculation by the Court,
which noted that one could not be sure that such a conventional relationship
would have enabled C&S to bring the full range of its services to the
suburban market. 49 Further, the Court indicated that not only was it
unrealistic to assume C&S might have founded new banks which might have
pursuant to worthy motives. At the time of the case, ICC's president was relatively
unknown. In due time his name, Robert Vesco, became more widely known.
42. 422 U.S. at 115-16.
43. Id. at 116.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 117.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 118-19.
49. Id. at 119.
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competed with it, but such an assumption totally disregarded the fact that
C&S's ultimate goal was always to acquire the branches as soon as legally
possible5 0
Permitting Anticompetitive Restraints To Be Justified By Procompetitive
Elements. In holding that an anticompetitive restraint such as price fixing
can be justified if it stems from a procompetitive relationship, the Court
broke away from the reluctance of recent years to permit such restraints. The
relevant line of recent cases involved interbrand versus intrabrand competition. In White Motor Co. v. United States,51 for example, the Court felt
that not enough was yet known about vertical customer and territorial
restrictions to declare them illegal per se, and stated: "They may be too
dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or staying in business .... ,,52 The Court went on to note
that the precise character of such a restriction in a given case could only be
5 3
determined at trial.
But in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,54 decided just four years after White
Motor Co., the Court brushed aside arguments that exclusive territories are
procompetitive when they enable small businessmen to jointly compete with
large companies through use of a common name and common advertising,
and stated that the exclusive territorial arrangement at issue was horizontal
rather than vertical and must therefore fall as being incident to an aggregation of restraints, including price fixing. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 55 decided the same day as Sealy, the Court rejected the argument that
vertical territorial and customer restrictions, uncontaminated by price fixing,
should be upheld as promoting interbrand competition when a manufacturer
sells its product to distributors. Rather, such restrictions were ruled to be
per se violations which could be imposed only if the manufacturer marketed
the product through an agency arrangement rather than through sale, and,
even then, they would be illegal if unreasonable.5 6

50. Id.
51. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).

52. Id.at 263.
53. Id. at 263-64.
54. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
55. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

56. Id. at 379-80. Interestingly, while the Court felt that such restrictions in agency
arrangements would be procompetitive because they would allow small manufacturers to
compete with larger organizations, id., it is precisely small manufacturers who would be
least able to afford the carrying costs of an agency system of distribution and who thus
could not be competitive on such a basis.
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Finally, in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,57 the Court rejected
the claim that exclusive territories and customer restrictions for private brand
labels should be allowed for members of a grocers' cooperative in order that
they might better compete against the giant food retailers who have their
own label brands. In a significant discussion, the Court wholly rejected the
concept that the judiciary was competent to, or permitted to, weigh a
diminution in competition in one segment of the economy against an increase
58
in another segment. Such weighing, said the Court, is for Congress alone.
It is clear, therefore, that in weighing procompetitive aspects in assessing
the legality of the correspondent associate relationship in C&S, the Court
retreated from its former position. In a sense, the retreat can be considered
to have occurred in an interbrand versus intrabrand case like the previous
ones, since the question in C&S was really whether "intrabrand" competition
among members of the C&S family could be sacrificed in favor of "interbrand" competition between the C&S family and other banks. In a
different sense, however, the retreat is much worse for antitrust enforcement
than it would have been in prior cases. In C&S, the Court weighed
interbrand competition in assessing the legality of a price fixing arrangement,
long considered the most heinous of antitrust violations, whereas, at least at
the Supreme Court level, the prior cases had not involved price fixing.
Indeed, it was asserted in the prior opinions that restraints that were
ancillary to price fixing would not be upheld even if they might be lawful
If the Court is willing to weigh
when not connected to price fixing.5
procompetitive elements in a price fixing case like C&S, then it can be
expected that it will be willing to weigh them in virtually every kind of case.
The C&S case also presents an excellent example of the wisdom expressed
in Topco regarding the judiciary's lack of ability to competently assess the
pros and cons of interbrand versus intrabrand competition. One important
element of the C&S opinion, for instance, is the Court's assertion that by de
facto branching C&S brought new competition and services to suburban
areas which would otherwise be captive to small unit banks. 60 The truth of
the Court's assertion is hardly self-evident-indeed, it is more likely to be
outright nonsense. The state of Illinois, for example, long has had a law
forbidding branching by commercial banks, confining them to a single location. 61 Yet this did not prevent some of the country's largest banks
57.
58.
59.
Motor

405 U.S. 596 (1972).
Id. at 609-10.
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1967); White
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 260 (1963).

60. 422 U.S. at 118.
61. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16'/2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd 1972).

The only exception to
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from growing up in Chicago, and these banks can and do serve the needs of,
and provide competitive alternatives for, customers in the vast Chicago
suburban area.
Similarly, in Washington, D.C., a current complaint is not that the banks
located in the city fail to service suburban needs or to provide competitive
alternatives there, but that they service suburban areas to a far greater
extent than they service customers in the District of Columbia itself. 62 While
I do not know what the precise situation was in Atlanta, I would consider it
rather amazing if a bank with 100 branches like C&S could not service
suburban customers in a metropolitan area smaller than the Chicago metropolitan area. People who need money will go downtown or across the city
line to get it. Perhaps de facto branching could provide competition and
services that would otherwise be lacking in small towns far removed from
a major city, but such branching hardly seems necessary in order to provide
alternatives in the suburbs.
Although the Court may very well have been correct in its conclusion,
there is another example in the C&S opinion which arguably shows that the
judiciary lacks competence to weigh interbrand versus intrabrand competition. The example concerns the Court's highly skeptical treatment of less
restrictive alternatives to the correspondent associate relationship.
As a preliminary confession of an ex-government lawyer, who like his
brethren did not meet payrolls but nevertheless dreamed up less restrictive
alternatives which businessmen assertedly could use, I confess to sometimes
being uneasy with the imagined alternatives which allegedly would be
workable in the real world. Yet, given the tremendously dominant oligopolistic position of C&S and its two biggest competitors in the Atlanta market,
and given the vital importance of banking and the cost of credit to the entire
economy, 63 one wonders whether the Court's skepticism should not have
given way to a more hospitable acceptance of the possibility of less restrictive
alternatives which would have increased competition in the banking sector.
The question of alternatives basically was whether, in the absence of the
correspondent associate relationship, a more conventional and more procomthis rule permits drive-in banks within 1,500 feet of the main bank. Such drive-in
facilities are limited in the business they may transact and are not considered branch
banks or branch offices. Id. § 105(15).
62. The banks in Washington have come under fire for the practice of "redlining,"
that is, using funds deposited by inner city residents to make loans to suburban residents
while refusing to make loans to the same inner city residents. See Washington Post,
May 12, 1975, § B, col. 1.
63. This factor has been stressed in past antitrust cases. E.g., United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
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petitive correspondent relationship would have arisen. The majority felt not,
on the grounds that the possibility of greater competition in a conventional
relationship was speculative and that it was unrealistic to assert that C&S
would have founded banks which would have competed with it and with
each other.6 4 The dissent felt, however, that C&S might have sponsored
conventional correspondent banks because such banks would have promoted
a profitable demand for C&S's services. 5 Moreover, if the merger were
struck down, the dissent thought competition could well increase because the
increasingly experienced de facto branches might begin to assume a more
independent posture and C&S itself might open de jure branches in the
suburbs. 66
There is no way of knowing with certainty which side is correct, since each
engaged in speculation. This very uncertainty, however, may indicate that,
as recognized in Topco, the courts are not competent to, and should not,
assess procompetitive versus anticompetitive aspects in an area like price
fixing. This is even more true when the judicial decision does not aid a
small or new firm seeking entrance to a market but instead may well foster
increased dominance by an already dominant firm in an oligopolistic market.
Since many provisions of the antitrust laws are directed against strong
concentrations of economic power, the courts are acting contrary to the oftexpressed will of Congress when they are hospitable to arguments fostering
such concentrations.
C. The Time of Suit Doctrine
In asserting that the de facto branch banks were a procompetitive method
of circumventing the state's antibranching law, the Court completely ignored
the fact that the law had been changed. As pointed out by the dissent, by
the time the Government brought suit it had become lawful for C&S to enter
the suburban market by founding new de jure branches or through a toehold
acquisition. 67 Since de novo entry would add competitors to the market,
the continuation of a correspondent associate relationship in its stead would
mean fewer competitors and less competition even without a merger between C&S and the de facto branches. In short, even if the founding of the
de facto banks was a procompetitive maneuver when the state's antibranching laws existed, the continuation of the correspondent associate relationship
68
became anticompetitive when the state laws were changed.
64. 422 U.S. at 119.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 142-43.
Justice Brennan suggested that if C&S's acquisition of the de facto branches were
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The doctrine that an arrangement which was once legal can become illegal
is not a new one in antitrust. Its most visible use in the Supreme Court's
antitrust jurisprudence is in the merger area, in which the clear meaning of
the United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.69 decision is that a

merger legal at its inception can later be successfully assailed under section 7
of the Clayton Act if it threatens competition at the time of suit. In the area
of restraints of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the doctrine is not
as well developed in Supreme Court opinions, although it has been clearly
articulated in a lower court decision involving a tie-in allegedly made
70
necessary by the technological state of the art.
At the Supreme Court level, the doctrine appears to exist in section 1 of
the Sherman Act cases mainly by implication. For example, in both Schwinn 7'
and White Motor Co., 72 the Court pointed out that certain restraints could
conceivably be necessary to enable a new or small company to break into or
stay in a market. A logical implication would be that restraints which are
necessary and therefore legal for such purposes would lose these characteristics if the small company grew into a giant or otherwise became highly entrenched.
The dissent in C&S would have followed the du Pont time of suit
doctrine, 73 a view which is far from appealing, since the entire doctrine is
subject to several objections. First, it enables the government to undo longstanding arrangements which not only may have been originally procompetitive and legal, but whose future, anticompetitive effects could not have been
foreseen at their inception. Moreover, the doctrine forces business executives and their counsel to try to decide when an ongoing arrangement has
become illegal and need cease. This is a difficult task intellectually and can
create severe uncertainty, although it is perhaps not more difficult nor
productive of greater uncertainty than an original determination as to
whether a particular practice violates any one of a host of laws at their
inception. The task of redecision also runs up against the very real human
problem that persons are loath to end a successful business practice-a
money-making status quo naturally has a powerful attraction. Yet failure to
end a practice when conditions have changed to the point at which a court
enjoined, "[t]he formation of de jure branches, ultimately in competition with former
correspondent associates,' would be a plausible result." Id. at 149.
69. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
70. See United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
71. 388 U.S. at 374.
72. 372 U.S. at 263.
73. 422 U.S. at 143 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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would find that it has become illegal can result in heavy treble damage
liability, even if criminal penalties would not be sought.
While the dissent's view is not terribly felicitous, it is in its favor that the
change in the state law to permit de jure branching was such a dramatic
alteration that it would ease the burden upon private parties of deciding
whether the correspondent associate relationship had become anticompetitive
and illegal even if it were once procompetitive and legal. On balance, it
may be that the majority's position is the sounder on this matter. But again,
the question is raised as to whether the majority will adhere to its view in
other cases in which the conditions surrounding an arrangement have
changed considerably. This may be more a problem of section 7 of the
Clayton Act than a problem of section 1 of the Sherman Act, since in the
past the question has been most directly faced by the Supreme Court in the
merger area rather than the restraint of trade area. In any event, if the
majority in C&S is willing to carry its view into widespread application, this
would mean the undoing of the du Pont time of suit doctrine.
D. The Intra-enterpriseConspiracy Doctrine
The Court's unwillingness to apply the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine-the doctrine that corporations belonging to the same corporate family
will be guilty of violating the law if they make agreements on prices,
markets, and the like-is contrary to a number of past cases. 74 Arguably,
it was desirable for the Court to break with those cases, since the intraenterprise doctrine has definite weaknesses. For example, when two corporations are part of a single corporate family-which excludes the situation in
which a subsidiary is formed as a joint venture between two independent corporate families-joint action between the parent and subsidiary is really action
by the same economic unit. It is questionable whether antitrust rules designed to prevent joint action between independent enterprises should be
applied when the two parties are really part of the same enterprise.
But while the Court broke with the intra-enterprise doctrine in C&S, it did
not appear to want to scrap it entirely, despite the doctrine's weaknesses.
Rather, the Court tried to narrow its inroads upon the doctrine by acknowledging prior applications of the doctrine, by pointing out that growth by
internal expansion rather than treaty is a central message of the Sherman
Act, by being willing to assume that ordinarily a business could not justify a
restraint of trade between itself and an independent competitor on the
ground that it had helped to launch the latter, and, most importantly, by
stressing that the establishment of the de facto branches was not an
74. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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anticompetitive act, but a procompetitive response to the anticompetitive
Georgia law which prohibited branch banking and which thereby allegedly
made suburban and rural areas captive to small unit banks. 75
Yet, although the Court sought to narrow its inroads, it is somewhat
difficult to see why a great deal of its logic could not be applied to a host of
other cases which can readily arise-for example, the common garden
variety business practice of forming a new subsidiary corporation to produce
or distribute the corporate parent's product in another market. In reality,
the formation of this new corporation constitutes internal expansion by
the original corporation even though a separate corporate form is utilized.
Moreover, the launching of a new corporation to increase productive
or distributive capacity is a procompetitive act. Finally, one could say,
as did the Court in C&S, that it is unrealistic to believe that the corporate
parent would have launched its progeny unless it could control the subsidiary's prices and policies. Thus the claim for exemption from the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine seems as strong here as in the C&S case.
Of course, there is a possible difference in the two cases. For a period of
time, the Georgia law prevented C&S, if it wished to expand to the suburbs,
from having any choice other than launching a new bank in a separate
corporate form. However, in the more common case, a corporation can
choose whether to launch the new enterprise as a separate corporation or as
a branch of the existing corporation. Since the choice of form exists in the
latter case, it is easier there than in C&S to make the intra-enterprise
conspiracy argument that, having deliberately "availed themselves of the
privilege of doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the obligations that the law
imposes on separate entities." '
It seems harsh, however, to make the application of the intra-enterprise
doctrine turn on whether state law formally bars a de jure branch or instead
gives a choice of form to the parent corporation. Often there are important
business and legal reasons, having to do with critical matters such as taxes or
liability, for deciding that the new business should take the form of a
separate corporation rather than a branch of the existing corporation. In
assessing whether to apply the intra-enterprise doctrine, there does not
appear to be any logical reason why such important business considerations
should be given short shrift while great weight is given to formal legal bars
such as those in Georgia.
75. 422 U.S. at 116-19.
76. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968).
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Moreover, in regard to the existence of choice, one might point out that
while, for a period, Georgia law prevented C&S from exercising any choice
other than separate corporate forms if it wished to expand into the suburbs,
nothing compelled C&S to choose to expand into the suburbs in the first
place. In that regard it had choice, and having chosen to expand, why
should it be able to free itself "from any of the obligations that the law
imposes on separate entities?" 77 Perhaps one might say that it should be
freed of such obligations in order to encourage internal expansion, a central
purpose of the Sherman Act. But on the other hand, not only the Sherman
Act, but many of the other provisions of the antitrust laws as well, have the
central purpose of preventing the kind of dominance and concentration of
power which was at issue in the C&S case.
III.

CONCLUSION

In both the Marine Bancorporation case of the 1973-74 Term and the
C&S case of the last term, the Supreme Court stressed the existence of legal
barriers to entry faced by large banks seeking to expand into new geographical areas. In both cases, the majority alleged the unlikelihood that the large
banks reasonably could expand into the target area in a less anticompetitive
fashion than was actually chosen. 78 The majority's allegation caused the
dissent in Marine Bancorporation to accuse the Court of "imposing its own
visions of reality in commercial banking markets," 79 and it seems the same
criticism should be leveled at the majority in C&S.
It seems, moreover, that the majority's vision of competitive reality is not
necessarily the same view as that reflected by the antitrust laws. The
actions permitted by the Court in Marine Bancorporation and C&S were
taken by large and dominant banks, and readily could or did lead to a
further concentration of economic power. In approving these actions, the
Court's attitude appeared to be quite favorable to "big business competition,"
as can be seen from its view that C&S's move into the suburbs brought a
range of services to a market which otherwise was captive to small unit
banks. Yet one can surely doubt that the antitrust laws were designed to be
so hospitable to increased concentrations of power at the expense of competition among a greater number of potential entities. Such doubts are particularly strong when the actions of the big business units are not necessary to enable them to provide services in the relevant market. Indeed, in the
context of the goals of the antitrust laws, one can say not only that the Court
77. Id. at 142.
78. See 422 U.S. at 118-20; 418 U.S. at 632-40.
79. 418 U.S. at 655 (White, J., dissenting).
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acted questionably in Marine Bancorporationwhen it approved a concentration-increasing arrangement by a dominant entity despite section 7 of the
Clayton Act,80 but also that its action in C&S was almost an outrage when it
approved a concentration-increasing arrangement by a dominant entity
despite the price fixing rules of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The current majority's seeming hospitality to "big business competition" in
the banking arena leads one to ask whether, in nonbanking areas in which
purely legal bars to entry and growth often are not as prevalent,"' the Court
will display the same solicitude for anticompetitive actions by which the big
get bigger despite the antitrust laws. 82 The answer is probably yes. In the
last analysis, one's view of a case depends on one's view of the antitrust laws,
competition, and concentration. The current Court's view does not seem
to augur well for antitrust. Thus, the most likely probability is that in future
cases the Court may well seize on business or economic bars to entry or
growth as a reason for approving actions that just a few years ago would
have stood little or no chance of legal success.
80. Indeed, the Court indicated that it will almost never be possible to bar a bank
merger using the theory of potential competition. See 418 U.S. at 641-42.
81. Even in banking, the bars to entry and growth may be far less insuperable than
the Court would suggest. The growth of C&S from three to 100 branches is itself a most
impressive indication of the possibilities for a small bank to grow to a significant size.
82. In regard to the Court's attitude toward big business, it is interesting to note that
even Justice Blackmun, a member of the "new antitrust majority," has accused the Court
of exhibiting "a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being." Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

